

**PLSC 41201: Militaries and Politics**  
Department of Political Science  
University of Chicago

Spring 2012  
Time: Wednesday, 9:30-12:20  
Room: Pick 506  
Office Hours: Tuesday, 2:00-4:00 pm and by appt.

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**Course Description**

This seminar studies how militaries shape political life. Militaries are pivotal political actors in much of the world. Their ability to engage in large-scale organized violence makes them powerful allies and dangerous foes for civilian elites and mass publics. We will examine militaries and state formation, how civil-military relations shape foreign policy and military strategy, military involvement in intrastate conflict, military governance, and tensions within militaries. Militaries are sometimes an outcome of other political and social processes, but can also have autonomy to act as an autonomous force. We will thus explore military structure and behavior as both a cause and a consequence of politics.

The broader goal of this course is identify a set of research agendas for the study of military politics. This is a rich area for study but it has suffered from inconsistent attention and a lack of cumulative research, both theoretical and empirical. As you will see, the literature is a mix of abstract theorizing, case studies, and cross-national quantitative studies that do not speak very well to one another. This seminar will therefore be as an opportunity to read broadly on militaries and politics in order to figure out where to go next. The readings may change and, if so, I will be sure to communicate changes to you. I have asked some of our Ph.D candidates to present their work to show what the research process involves and to introduce you to new research horizons.

**Course Requirements**

**Participation** in class discussion is essential for a successful seminar. Students are expected to have carefully done all of the required reading and to be prepared to discuss it in detail. I realize that some weeks there is a very heavy reading load, but the works assigned are important and worth your time. You should carefully plan ahead to make sure that you have devoted enough time to heavy weeks; reading ahead can be important (weeks 2, 4, 6, and 8 are particularly rough). It is better not to take this class than to take it without being willing to commit to the workload. Participation will account for 20% of your grade.

**Two response papers** (each no more than 4 pages, doubled-spaced, 12-point font) will be assigned. In week 4 I will assign a paper due in week 5 and in week 8 I will assign a paper due in week 9. The paper topic will identify an important claim from our readings in the previous weeks and ask you to critically assess it in light of our reading and discussions. These are not opportunities for you to do a literature review or summary of readings, but instead to advance an argument. Each paper will account for 10% of your grade. I will provide the topic at the end of

class and the paper will be due in hard copy at the beginning of the next class meeting. Late papers will not be accepted.

**Research paper** of no more than 30 pages total (doubled-spaced, 12-point font, 1-inch margins) due at the end of the quarter. It can be emailed to me or dropped off at my office by 5 pm CST, Thursday, June 7, 2012. This paper should address a major question in the study of military politics with a literature review, theoretical argument, and empirical evaluation of the theory relative to its competitors. This empirical evaluation can include a case or comparative case studies, quantitative analysis, or a mix of methods. Students can use this opportunity to lay the groundwork for a publishable article, develop research for a thesis, or “try out” a possible dissertation topic. Please note that this is a hard space limit: the entire paper must not be more than 30 pages. I may reduce your grade for excess.

The paper will account for 60% of your grade. You must confirm your topic with me, in person or over email, before our Week 7 class meeting. Late papers will not be accepted.

### **Electronic Etiquette**

I request that students not use their laptops, cell phones, or PDAs during class for any reason. This will allow more focused discussion and intellectual exchange.

I aim to be responsive to email from students. However, please do not expect an answer to your question any sooner than 48 hours after it is sent. Last-minute email questions and requests are bad for everyone involved. I prefer that students use office hours rather than email for asking substantive questions.

### **Books for Purchase**

These are available for purchase at the Seminary Co-op.

Brooks, Risa. *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Callahan, Mary P. *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Centeno, Miguel Angel. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.

Downing, Brian M. *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Posen, Barry. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Required articles and book sections that are not drawn from the books for purchase can be found through the online Chalk system (<http://chalk.uchicago.edu> - these works are identified as such) or the University of Chicago Library website. You should already be familiar with how to track down articles online and if a work in question is not on Chalk or a required book, assume that it is your job to find the piece.

### **Academic Integrity**

This is the University of Chicago's Academic Integrity statement:

“It is contrary to justice, to academic integrity, and to the spirit of intellectual inquiry to submit the statements or ideas of work of others as one's own. To do so is plagiarism or cheating, offenses punishable under the University's disciplinary system. Because these offenses undercut the distinctive moral and intellectual character of the University, we take them very seriously. Proper acknowledgment of another's ideas, whether by direct quotation or paraphrase, is expected. In particular, if any written or electronic source is consulted and material is used from that source, directly or indirectly, the source should be identified by author, title, and page number, or by website and date accessed. Any doubts about what constitutes "use" should be addressed to the instructor.”

If you have questions, ask me and/or consult Charles Lipson's *Doing Honest Work in College* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Any violations of university standards will be automatically referred to higher authorities.

### **1. Introduction and Basic Overview**

- Peter Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (1999)  
 Skim literature review in Paul Staniland, “Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective.” *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 322–362.
- Powell, Jonathan M, and Clayton L Thyne. “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010.” *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (March 2011): 249–259.

### **2. Militaries and State Formation: The European and American Experiences**

- Downing, *The Military Revolution*, all.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), chapters 3 and 4 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Hintze. Otto. "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975) (Chalk e-reserves)
- Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, chapters 2 and 6
- Thomson, Janice E. 1994. *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Chapters 1-2 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Posen, Barry R. “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power.” *International Security* 18,

no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 80–124.

### **3. Civil-Military Relations: Objective Control and Its Discontents**

Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, and pp. 464-466

Finer, S. E. *The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), chapters 4 and 7 (Chalk e-reserves)

Feaver, Peter D., “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society*, 23, 2 (Winter 1996): 149-178

Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), chapters 1 and 2 (Chalk e-reserves)

### **4. Militaries, Strategy, and Foreign Policy**

Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, all.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. *International Security* 9 (1): 58–107.

Heginbotham, Eric. “The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military Organizations, Domestic Politics, and Grand Strategy.” *International Security* 27, no. 2 (2002): 86–125.

Betts, Richard K. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises 2<sup>nd</sup>*. Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), chapters 1 and 3 (Chalk e-reserves)

Gelpi, Christopher, and Peter D. Feaver. 2002. Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force. *The American Political Science Review* 96 (4): 779–793.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization* 62 (1): 35–64.

[Response Paper #1 will be assigned at this class meeting]

### **5. Control of the Military Instrument**

*We will have Ph.D candidate Shawn Cochran come to part of this class and present some of his work on the civil-military politics of war termination*

Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, all.

Snyder, Jack. *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), chapters 1 and 8. (Chalk e-reserves)

Talmadge, Caitlin. “Explaining Military Effectiveness: Best Practices and Battlefield Performance.” manuscript, 2012 (Chalk Course Documents)

Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2002), chapter 1, Appendix (Chalk e-reserves)

Goemans, Hein. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), chapters 2 and 5 (Chalk e-reserves)

Cochran paper (Chalk Course Documents)

[Response Paper #1 will be due at this class meeting]

## **6. Militaries and State Formation: Violence and Politics in the Developing World**

Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, all.

Vu, Tuong. "Studying the State Through State Formation." *World Politics* 62, no. 01 (2010): 148–175.

Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa." *International Security* 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990): 117–139.

Reno, Will. *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), chapters 1 and 2 (Chalk e-reserves)

Londregan, John B., and Keith T. Poole. "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power." *World Politics* 42, no. 02 (1990): 151–183.

Jalal, Ayesha. *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapters 2 and 4 (Chalk e-reserves)

## **7. Armies and Rule: Modernization, Personalization, and Dictatorship**

Huntington, *Political Order*, chapters 1, 4, 5, 7

Geddes, Barbara. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 115–144.

Slater, Dan. "Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia." In James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds.), *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapter 5 (Chalk e-reserves)

Boudreau, Vincent. *Resisting dictatorship: repression and protest in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapters 3 and 7 (Chalk e-reserves)

Albertus, Michael. "Explaining Patterns of Redistribution Under Autocracy: The Case of Peru's Revolution from Above." manuscript, 2012  
([http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1848124](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1848124))

## **8. Wars at Home: Counterinsurgency and Countersubversion**

Callahan, *Making Enemies*, all.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, Chapters 6, 7. (Chalk e-reserves)

Caverley, Jonathan D. "The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam." *International Security* 34, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 119–157.

McCoy, Alfred W. *Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy*. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1999), chapters 6 and 7 (Chalk e-reserves)

Stepan, Alfred. "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (Yale University Press, 1973), chapter 2 (Chalk e-reserves)

Lee, Terence. "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia." *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (May 2009): 640–669.

[Response Paper #2 will be assigned at this class meeting]

### **9. Social Division and the Military**

- Kier, Elizabeth. *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1997), chapters 3 and 4 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. chapters 11 and 12 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Merom, Gil. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapters 3 and 4 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Quinlivan, James T. "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Autumn 1999): 131–165.
- Stanley, William Deane. *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), chapters 3 and 4 (Chalk e-reserves)

[Response Paper #2 will be due at this class meeting]

### **10. Comparative Coercion**

*We will have Ph.D candidate Jonathan Obert come to part of this class and present some of his work on the origins of different local security institutions in the 19<sup>th</sup>-century United States*

- Taylor, Brian D. *State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2011), chapters 1 and 2 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Singer, P.W. "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security." *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02): 186-220.
- Ahram, Ariel. *Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), chapters 1 and 2 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Davis, Diane E., and Anthony W. Pereira, eds. *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 1 (Chalk e-reserves)
- Obert paper (Chalk Course Documents)
- Staniland, Paul. "Governing Coercion: States and Violence in Asia" research agenda piece (Chalk Course Documents)